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INTRODUCTION 
The petitioner# the Utah Bankers Association (the "UBA"), 
has filed this Reply Brief in support of its petition for judicial 
review. The UBA seeks judicial review of an order of the 
Commissioner of the Utah Department of Financial Institutions 
(respectively, the "Commissioner11 and the "Department") approving 
an application of Credit Union Service Centers of Utah, Inc. (the 
"CUSC Applicant") to operate a "credit union service center" in 
Utah (the "CUSC") on behalf of several Utah credit unions. The 
CUSC has intervened to join the Commissioner as respondents in this 
matter• 
In brief summary, the UBA objected to the CUSC 
application because it expressly assumes and perpetuates a 
fundamental misapplication by the Commissioner of the Utah statutes 
that limit geographically defined "fields of membership" for Utah 
credit unions. Those statutes limit membership of Utah credit 
unions with geographic (rather than associational) fields of 
membership to the residents of an area no more expansive than one 
county. By approving the CUSC application, the Commissioner 
improperly allowed those credit unions to claim and solicit members 
from multiple counties. 
The UBA also objected to the CUSC application because the 
Commissioner failed to apply the statute that limits such centers 
to providing services through "automated or electronic" means. 
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I. STATEMENTS BY THE HEARING OFFICER THAT THE MULTI-COUNTY FIELD 
OF MEMBERSHIP WAS NOT AT ISSUE ARE IRRELEVANT. 
The respondents' references to statements made by the 
Department's hearing officer that the multi-county field of 
membership was not at issue are irrelevant. The record of the 
hearing is clear that the credit union participants in the CUSC, 
including several credit unions claiming multi-county fields of 
membership, anticipate the use of the CUSC as a means to solicit 
new memberships. Furthermore, the Commissioner restated the 
Department's belief that Utah credit unions can have geographic 
fields of membership covering multiple counties. In short, the 
Commissioner approved the solicitation of memberships through the 
CUSC with a fundamental assumption that violates the field of 
membership statutes. 
Any statement by the hearing officer regarding the 
relevance of the field of membership issue was made only in light 
of the Department's desire to restate the Department policy to 
disregard the statutory field of membership limitations and 
apparently to make it clear that because of that policy it was not 
an issue that would be entertained despite the fact that it was 
specifically raised by the UBA. The statement was not based on any 
determination that solicitation of membership was irrelevant to the 
CUSC application or to the activities of the CUSC and its 
participants. Moreover, arguments by the respondents that 
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solicitation will occur only within each credit union,s field of 
membership is meaningless if the field, as identified, violates 
state law. 
II. THE FIELD OF MEMBERSHIP CONSTRAINTS THAT ARE APPLICABLE TO 
EACH CREDIT UNION ARE ALSO APPLICABLE TO THE CUSC. 
The respondents then make the flawed argument that the 
field of membership statutes, although applicable to individual 
credit unions, are not applicable to the CUSC. The respondents 
suggest that the participating credit unions in the CUSC are 
permitted to undertake activities through the CUSC that are 
otherwise prohibited when undertaken otherwise. The participating 
credit unions cannot do collectively that which is prohibited 
individually. Unlawful solicitation of new members will remain 
just as unlawful even if conducted through the conduit of the CUSC. 
III. THE COMMISSIONER CANNOT APPROVE BRANCHING IF ONE OF THE 
PURPOSES OF THE BRANCH IS TO ENGAGE IN UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY. 
To divert attention from the field of membership 
statutes, the respondents improperly recast the UBA's opposition to 
the CUSC application as being an issue as to the permissible 
location of branch offices. The UBA is not seeking enforcement of 
the branching statutes; it seeks enforcement of the field of 
membership statutes. The issue is not with the location of branch 
offices. The issue is whether the Commissioner may approve a 
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credit union branch when the Commissioner has received sworn 
testimony that one of the purposes of that branch is to solicit 
memberships among residents who are not qualified to be members. 
In an attempt to illustrate a relationship between 
branching and the field of membership limitations, the UBA posed a 
hypothetical circumstance involving a credit union with a field of 
membership that includes the residents of Davis County. The UBA 
suggested that it may be appropriate for that credit union to have 
a branch in downtown Salt Lake City to provide services for Davis 
County residents who work in Salt Lake City but not appropriate to 
claim a branch office in Utah County given the more remote 
relationship between Utah County and the Davis County field of 
membership. 
The point of this hypothetical is not whether the Davis 
County credit union could have a branch office in Utah County. The 
point is that if the Commissioner in that instance approved a Utah 
County branch, such approval would need to be with a mandate, as 
required by statute, that the membership could not include 
residents of Utah County. The Commissioner could not approve the 
Utah County branch with the understanding that a purpose of that 
branch was to solicit memberships from Utah County residents in 
violation of the field of membership statute. 
Similarly, it was incorrect for the Commissioner to 
approve the CUSC application with the express understanding that it 
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will be used by credit unions that claim multi-county fields of 
membership to solicit memberships from multiple counties in 
violation of state law. 
The Commissioner bears the responsibility of enforcing 
the state statutes regarding financial institutions and has been 
entrusted with certain powers to ensure compliance, for example, 
Utah Code Annotated §7-1-307 provides that " [i]f the [Commissioner 
has determined that any institution . . . is about to violate any 
applicable provision of this title, . . . the [Commissioner may 
issue a cease and desist order against such institution . . . . " 
The proposed violations of the field of membership statute by the 
CUSC participants is not only an instance in which the Commissioner 
has chosen not to enforce a statutory violation. The Commissioner 
has, in fact, given his blessing to the prospective violation of 
the statute. The Commissioner cannot justify his approval of the 
violation of the field of membership statute by characterizing it 
as a branching issue. 
IV. THE WORD "COUNTY" CANNOT BE READ TO MEAN "COUNTIES". 
The respondents' claim that the word "county" in the 
field of membership statute should be read to mean "counties" 
nullifies the entire field of membership statute. The respondents 
draw from Utah Code Annotated §68-3-12 for the general proposition 
that the singular includes the plural and that the plural means the 
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singular when undertaking statutory interpretation. However, such 
interchangeable construction is not permitted if it "would be 
inconsistent with the manifest intent of the Legislature or 
repugnant to the context of the statute." Id. The definition of 
field of membership, which assumes a "group,M Id. §7-9-3(5), is 
based on the commonality of its members. The Legislature has drawn 
the field of membership guidelines to recognize the various 
organizational or geographic circumstances that could create such 
a "group." A construction of that statute that, in effect, permits 
a field of membership of all residents of Utah is inconsistent with 
the intent of the statute and renders meaningless the carefully 
drawn parameters for fields of membership. It is true that a 
credit union field of membership could reach from Brigham City to 
St. George, but only if there is an associational basis for such a 
membership which fulfills the fundamental assumption of a "group." 
V. THE CUSC CANNOT OPERATE IN VIOLATION OP THE STATUTORY 
LIMITATIONS ON CREDIT UNION SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS. 
The claim that the CUSC was approved under the general 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated §7-1-303, which makes a general 
statement regarding joint, cooperative efforts among financial 
institutions, does not limit the specific application of Section 7-
9-5(29), governing credit unions. Section 7-9-5(29) provides that 
credit unions (with Commissioner approval) may: 
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participate in systems which allow the transfer, 
withdrawal, or deposit of funds of credit unions or 
credit union members by automated or electronic means and 
hold membership in entities established to promote and 
effectuate these systems, if the participation is not 
inconsistent with the law and rules of the department, 
and if any credit union participating in any system 
notifies the department as provided by law. 
The services that may be provided by a credit~ union service 
organization for its participants are limited to services through 
automated or electronic means. The general principle of "shared 
branches" is not contemplated by this section. Notwithstanding the 
general references in Section 7-1-303 to cooperative, joint efforts 
by financial institutions, that section cannot supersede the 
specific guidelines of Section 7-9-5(29) relating to credit unions. 
General provisions regarding cooperative efforts by financial 
institutions do not supersede the specific provisions applicable to 
credit unions. See Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Board of 
State Lands and Forestry of the State of Utah, 830 P.2d 233, 235 
(Utah 1992) (specific statutory language controls general 
language) . The consideration by the Commissioner of the CUSC 
application erroneously failed to include the limitations of 
Section 7-9-5(29). In fact, the Commissioner suggests that perhaps 
the limitations of Section 7-9-5(29) posed a problem for the 
Department in considering the CUSC application. Commissioner's 
Brief at 21. 
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Also, as mentioned in the UBA's initial brief, the desire 
of the CUSC Applicant and the participating credit unions to 
operate the service center as a "full-service" shared branch of 
each of the credit unions is an unlawful combination of a "branch" 
and a "consumer funds transfer facility". The statutory 
definitions of "branch" and "consumer funds transfer facility" are 
harmonious, but were applied incorrectly by the Commissioner. A 
branch of a financial institution may receive and pay deposits, 
other than as a consumer funds transfer facility. .Id. §7-1-103. 
Yet, the CUSC Applicant's proposal demonstrates the intent to have 
the service centers serve as both consumer funds transfer 
facilities and as branches. Such intention violates the applicable 
statutes that provide that such facilities are mutually exclusive. 
VI. NO DEFERENCE SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE COMMISSIONER'S DISREGARD 
OF THE LIMITED FIELD OF MEMBERSHIP STATUTES. 
The respondents ask for deference in the ongoing decision 
of the Department to permit state wide memberships for Utah state 
credit unions. The respondents seek justification from other 
statutes that give the Commissioner general powers and 
responsibilities. By describing the broad powers of the 
Commissioner and the ability of the Commissioner to make findings 
and determinations in a myriad of circumstances, the Commissioner 
claims discretion in the application of the geographical 
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limitations set forth by the Legislature. Regardless of such 
powers, the Commissioner cannot argue that his perspective (or the 
perspective of Mr. Kwant, the source of the multi-county field of 
membership) of the financial institution marketplace supersedes 
legislative mandate and justifies a disregard for the detailed 
definition of a "limited field of membership." Although the 
legislature may have delegated many broad responsibilities to the 
Commissioner, those responsibilities do not include discretion to 
ignore fundamental statutory limitations on Utah credit unions. 
The Commissioner also seeks justification for the 
disregard of the field of membership limitations by discussing the 
liberalization of "branching" that has occurred in the state within 
the last decade. But the Commissioner has not been granted any 
discretion to alter the statutory limitations on fields of 
membership. The Commissioner cannot assume a legislative role in 
this matter. The ability of the CUSC participants to solicit 
members in violation of the field of membership statute does not 
turn on whether the disregard for the statute made sense, seemed 
appropriate, or appeared necessary to the Commissioner. 
The Commissioner claims also that the Court should give 
deference to the Department's decision to permit unlimited fields 
of membership L>y CUSC participants because of the Commissioner's 
right to approve the credit union bylaws that set forth the limited 
field of membership. The right to approve the limited field of 
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membership in a set of bylaws does not assume the right to ignore 
the statutory framework of those limitations. 
The application of the field of membership statutes does 
not require any fact finding by the Commissioner. It does not 
require the expertise of the Commissioner. It does not raise 
issues of discretion or judgment. The application of the field of 
membership statute is a matter of law. The Commissioner's 
particular view of the statute is irrelevant. 
A well known Utah branch banking case illustrates, by 
analogy, that the application of the field of membership statute to 
the activities of the CUSC participants is a matter of law. In the 
case of Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Taylor, 390 P.2d 592 (Utah 
1964), Walker Bank filed a lawsuit to set aside a decision of the 
state bank commissioner that allowed State Bank of Provo to open 
another branch in Provo. The Utah branching statute at the time 
prohibited a state bank from branching in a city such as Provo 
unless the bank takes over an existing bank. 
State Bank of Provo argued that certainly the statute 
should not prevent a bank from branching in its own community. The 
Utah Supreme Court disagreed by applying the literal reading of the 
branching statute. The court was not persuaded by the state bank 
commissioner's interpretation of the statute nor by prior decisions 
of the commissioner to grant similar applications. The court said, 
n[S]uch actions are not persuasive in this case to induce us to 
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vary the very unambiguous terms of our branch banking statutes." 
Id. at 595. The court in the Walker Bank case recognized that 
issues of statutory interpretation are for the courts, not the 
agency. The court said, "The question here involved, being 
strictly one of law, is for the courts . . . ." Id. 
VII. THE STATE COURT RECOGNIZED THAT THE FIELD OF MEMBERSHIP ISSUE 
WAS A LEGAL ISSUE FOR THE COURT. 
As this Court is aware, the Third District Court for Salt 
Lake County dismissed a complaint filed by the UBA with respect to 
the enforcement of the field of membership statutes after a 
decision by the district court that the UBA members did not have 
standing to seek compliance by its competitors with applicable 
state law. With due respect, the decision of the district court 
not to address the statutory violations of Utah credit unions was 
made in error, and the UBA has appealed that dismissal. 
Nonetheless, in the district court's memorandum decision, in which 
the court improperly found a lack of standing, the Court emphasized 
that no deference should be given to the Commissioner in his 
interpretation or application of the field of membership statute. 
The court stated: "[T]he ultimate question presented by the [UBA] 
is neither factual nor a mixed question of fact and law. It is 
purely a question of law, and the expertise of the Department does 
not place it in a better position than this court to interpret the 
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statutes enacted by the legislative branch." Memorandum Decision 
and Order at pp. 5-6 (a copy of which is attached as Exhibit ffF" to 
the Commissioner's Brief). 
VIII. THE UBA HAS STANDING TO SEEK JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE CUSC 
APPLICATION BECAUSE OF ITS INVOLVEMENT IN THE COMMISSIONER'S 
PROCEEDING. 
The UBA's involvement in the Commissioner's proceedings 
to consider the CUSC application is grounds for standing to seek 
judicial review of the Commissioner's decision in that proceeding. 
The Commissioner recognized the right of the UBA to participate in 
the Department's proceedings, served notice of the hearing on the 
UBA, received and considered objections to the CUSC application 
submitted by the UBA, and permitted the UBA to cross-exam witnesses 
and present evidence at the adjudicative proceeding. The 
Commissioner cannot invite the UBA to participate in the agency 
adjudicative process and then claim that the UBA has no standing to 
seek judicial review of the Commissioner's proceedings. The 
Commissioner acknowledges in his responsive brief that the standing 
of the UBA to participate in the Commissioner's proceedings was 
recognized by the hearing officer. Commissioner's Brief at 40. 
Even putting aside the involvement of the UBA in the CUSC 
application proceeding, any financial institution has the right to 
ensure that a decision of the Commissioner to permit, in effect, a 
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new form of financial institution is made pursuant to and 
consistent with applicable statutes. It would be wrong to suggest 
that an institution cannot seek compliance by its supervisory 
agency in approving the activities of a competing institution. 
IX. THE UBA HAS STANDING TO SEEK JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE 
STANDING GUIDELINES ESTABLISHED BY UTAH LAW. 
As mentioned previously in this Brief, the dismissal by 
the Third District Court of a lawsuit seeking enforcement of the 
field of membership statutes for lack of standing is being appealed 
by the UBA. This petition for judicial review of the CUSC 
application does not carry with it the same standing inquiry. As 
stated previously, the involvement of the UBA in the Department 
proceedings and the general right of a financial institution to 
ensure that its supervisory agency follow applicable statutes in 
approving the activities of its competitors make this petition for 
judicial review unrelated to the determination of the state court 
proceeding. Nonetheless, the respondents have restated their 
standing argument made in the district court. Accordingly, this 
Reply Brief will comment on the appropriate standing of the UBA 
even under the standards suggested by the respondents. 
A. Utah law recognizes associational standing. 
The UBA's petition for judicial review of the CUSC 
application is consistent with the standing principles articulated 
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by Utah case law. First of all, Utah law has recognized the 
ability of an association to bring an action on behalf of its 
members. Society of Professional Journalists, Utah Chapter v. 
Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1175 (Utah 1987) ("Society of 
Journalists"). Drawing on federal case law, the Utah Supreme Court 
has stated that the association need only show that " (i) the 
individual members of the association have standing to sue; and 
(ii) the nature of the claim and of the relief sought does not make 
the individual participation of each injured party indispensable to 
proper resolution of the case." £d. , quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 
U.S. 490 (1975). 
The Utah Supreme Court has emphasized that this analysis 
for associational standing, which provides a practical way of 
asserting common claims, is a "pragmatic one" and does not involve 
a "sterile approach." Utah Restaurant Association v. Davis County 
Board of Health, 709 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Utah 1985). Associational 
standing permits the sharing of litigation costs and the attendant 
risks, rather than requiring one member to bear that entire burden. 
Id. More importantly, the Utah Supreme Court is fearful that a 
denial of associational standing may prevent "the assertion of 
valid claims without serving any countervailing public purpose." 
Id. 
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B. The UBA members have individual standing to sue. 
Utah case law has articulated three (3) independent 
grounds for the establishment of standing. Terracor v. Utah Board 
of State Lands & Forestry, 716 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1986). The 
independent grounds articulated by the Utah Supreme Court are: 
1. Standing is established if the plaintiff can show 
some "distinct and palpable injury that gives rise to a 
personal stake in the outcome of the dispute." 
2. Standing is established "if no one else has a 
greater interest in the outcome of the case and the 
issues are unlikely to be raised at all unless that 
particular plaintiff has standing to raise the issue." 
3. Standing will be established "if the issues are 
unique and of such great public importance that they 
ought to be decided in furtherance of the public 
interest." 
Id. These independent grounds for standing have been recently 
restated by this Court in the case of Sierra Club v. Department of 
Environmental Quality. Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste, 857 
P.2d 982,986-87 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
The UBA has standing under each of these ground for 
standing. The UBA will be injured by the decision of the 
Commissioner to permit the participating credit unions to use the 
CUSC to solicit memberships in violation of the field of membership 
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statutes or to otherwise engage in activities not permitted by the 
statutes permitting such service organizations; the UBA is the only 
party that will seek enforcement of the applicable statutes; and 
the statewide violation of the field of membership statute presents 
a unique issue of public importance. 
!• The UBA members meet the "injury" grounds for 
standing." The Utah Supreme Court has discussed how the "injury" 
requirement for standing can be satisfied when a party has claimed 
an adverse effect from a governmental action. In case of Society 
of Professional Journalists, Utah Chapter v. Bullock. 743 P.2d 1166 
(Utah 1987), journalists challenged a trial court's order that 
closed a competency hearing in the Lafferty murder case. The court 
began its analysis, which lead to the conclusion that standing was 
proper, by identifying the common right of journalists, as well as 
the public, to have access to judicial proceedings. Although the 
court acknowledged that because of this right it might be said that 
if one person is denied access, that person has no interest that is 
not held in common with all, and, as result that person has not 
suffered a "personal adverse impact," the court, nevertheless, held 
that in such instances, in which a complaint regarding improper 
governmental action may seem "generalized," reference should be 
made to "the policies underlying standing." Id. at 1173-74. 
Standing in such instances does not turn on whether each plaintiff 
can show a personal adverse effect. Standing turns on whether the 
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dispute between the parties has crystallized. Id. The Court in 
the Society of Journalists Case concluded that the plaintiffs had 
satisfied the standing requirement, even though a personal adverse 
affect had not been shown. The court drew additional comfort from 
the fact that the issues of the case were not abstract and 
academic. They were concrete and crystallized. Furthermore, the 
rights were being pursued by those having a "direct interest." Id. 
The decision of the Commissioner to permit Utah credit 
unions to use the CUSC as a method to solicit memberships in 
violation of the field of membership statute has and will result in 
competitive and economic injury to Utah banks. Furthermore, the 
UBA, on behalf of those members, is not asserting a right that 
requires or contemplates the attention of another branch of 
government. 
Such attention has already been given to the issue by the 
other branches of government. The geographical scope of credit 
union membership has already been decided by the Legislature in a 
detailed statute. Furthermore, the Utah Attorney General has 
chosen by its support of the CUSC application to permit the 
Commissioner to continue his disregard for credit union membership 
statutes. 
It is ironic for the Commissioner to be saying that the 
court cannot hear this case when the Attorney General,s office has 
made it clear that any recourse to the executive branch of 
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government by Utah banks to remedy this statutory violation with 
respect to the CUSC would be futile. 
The issues in this matter are concrete and clear. The 
issues do not involve a political or philosophical analysis; they 
involve the legal limitations of the field of membership statute, 
with objective geographical guidelines. The objections to the CUSC 
application are brought by competitors that have a direct, 
competitive interest in ensuring compliance with those statutes. 
The principles of standing should never warrant disregard of 
objections brought by a party that alleges unlawful activities by 
its competitor. 
2. The UBA has standing because no one else will bring 
the statutory violations to the attention of the Court. It is very 
unlikely that any other party will bring to the attention of the 
courts the anticipated statutory violation by the CUSC and its 
participating credit unions. This alone establishes standing for 
the UBA members. The only party who could have possibly sought 
compliance is the Attorney General. Instead, the Attorney General 
has chosen to support the Commissioner and the participating credit 
unions in the disregard for the statutory guidelines. If the UBA 
cannot seek compliance by the CUSC and its participants, then who 
will? 
3. The statutory violations create an issue of public 
importance. The decision of the Commissioner to permit statewide 
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fields of memberships in violation of the statutory limitations on 
such memberships presents an issue that affects the entire state. 
These statutory violations do not affect only a company or a 
particular group. The violations affect the entire financial 
institution industry and touches all geographic areas of Utah, 
Furthermore, the Attorney General, given the responsibility of 
ensuring compliance by state agencies, has abdicated such 
responsibilities in this instance. 
C The Third District Court erroneously ruled that the 
UBA complaint to seek compliance with the field of membership 
statute should be dismissed for lack of standing. 
Again, this petition for judicial review is not intended 
to address the recent decision of the Third District Court 
dismissing the lawsuit by the UBA against the credit unions that 
claimed multi-county, geographic fields of memberships. 
Nonetheless, given the respondents' argument regarding the standing 
of the UBA to seek judicial review in this instance, coupled with 
their references made to the state court decision, the UBA wanted 
to briefly highlight, with due respect, some of the erroneous 
analysis of the Third District Court regarding standing. For 
example, the district court did not focus on the "crystallized" 
nature of the statutory violation which, as stated in Society of 
Journalists, \:juld meet the "injury" requirement when addressing 
the failure of government to comply with applicable law. The 
district court did not address the unwillingness of the Attorney 
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General to enforce the statutes. The district court blended the 
second and third independent grounds for standing. Rather than 
acknowledging standing on the grounds that no other party would 
seek compliance (which fact the district court assumed to be true 
and which alone would establish standing), the district court 
stated that in such instances the party must also convince the 
court that the issue is of public importance, thereby satisfying 
the third basis for standing. The district court failed to 
recognize the independent nature of the second and third grounds 
for standing. See Sierra Club v. Department of Environmental 
Quality, Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste, 857 P.2d 982,986-87 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (which reiterates the independence of these 
grounds for standing). In light of these and other legal errors, 
any reliance by this Court on the analysis of the district court in 
the state court litigation with respect to standing would be 
misguided. 
D. The Members of the UBA Are Not Indispensable Parties. 
The petition for judicial review filed by the UBA in a 
representative capacity satisfies the second of the two elements 
for associational standing. The members of the UBA are not 
indispensable parties to this effort to prevent the violation of 
the field of membership statutes by the CUSC participants. Neither 
the objections made by the UBA nor the relief it seeks with respect 
to the CUSC application requires the UBA members to be a party to 
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this lawsuit. The objections of the UBA do not turn on the unique 
circumstances of any one bank and the relief sought is not intended 
to benefit one bank more than another. All members are intended to 
be benefitted. 
X. THE DOCTRINES OF ESTOPPEL AND LACHES ARE INAPPLICABLE TO THE 
CUSC APPLICATION. 
The UBA objections to the recent CUSC application does 
not raise any concerns of estoppel and laches. As acknowledged by 
the respondents, the district court in the state court litigation 
acknowledged that estoppel and laches do not prevent the UBA's 
objection to the CUSC application. Commissioner's Brief at 50. 
Nonetheless, the respondents claim that the Commissioner can 
approve the CUSC application notwithstanding its inherent statutory 
violation because of the years that have passed since the Kwant 
memorandum, which assumed a legislative right to remove the 
statutory limitations on geographic fields of memberships. 
Neither estoppel nor laches is intended to permit a 
violation of a statute by which the legislature has intended to 
protect depositors and borrowers. In effect, the defendants are 
arguing that the UBA is barred from enforcing the statute because 
of the credit union's reliance on the Commissioner's improper 
approval of the expanded fields of membership. Given the objective 
of the field of membership statutes to protect the depositors and 
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borrowers, it is wrong to suggest that the public protection sought 
by the legislature is subject to the doctrines of estoppel or 
laches. These doctrines have their place in private or 
individualized disputes. They have no application in issues 
involving or affecting the public at large. 
As a general matter, arguments such as estoppel and 
laches cannot be asserted with respect to actions of a governmental 
entity. See Anderson v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 839 P.2d 822, 827 
(Utah 1992) . The general rule is particularly true when a 
misinterpretation of a statute has been made. The "rule safeguards 
the interests of the public which may be jeopardized by the 
'vagaries of political tides, frequent changes of public officials, 
the possibility of collusion, or of circumventing procedures set up 
by law, then suing for the value of goods furnished or services 
rendered.7" Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 769 (Utah 1991) (quoting 
Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1982)). 
An example of the Utah Supreme Court7s unwillingness to 
use procedural arguments based on estoppel or delay to avoid the 
consequences of a misinterpreted statute is found in Prows v Utah, 
822 P. 2d 764 (Utah 1991). In Prows. the plaintiffs sued the State 
of Utah and the Department of Financial Institutions, after the 
Department declared their thrift insolvent and seized its assets. 
Id. at 765. The plaintiffs claimed that the state had represented 
that the ILGC insurance fund was guaranteed by the state, and the 
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plaintiffs sought to estop the Commissioner of Financial 
Institutions from denying that the thrift's deposits were 
unconditionally insured up to $15,000 per depositor. Id. at 769. 
The court found the elements of estoppel present, but concluded 
that estoppel could not be invoked against the state. Id. In 
reaching this result, the court relied on the general rule that 
estoppel cannot be asserted where the activities in question are 
strictly prohibited by statute. The Prows court concluded that the 
Commissioner's representations were "in direct contravention of 
[the] statutory limitations. Id. 
This principal that the passage of time or reliance does 
not justify statutory violations has been recognized by other case 
law. See Enfield v. Kleppe. 566 F.2d 1139, 1142 (10th Cir. 1977) 
("If [an] interpretive rule does not accurately express the meaning 
contained in [the relevant] statutory provision, it cannot operate. 
The statute prevails now and has prevailed from the outset. The 
length of time that the faulty regulation was on the books is of no 
consequence because an administrative provision contrary to statute 
must be overturned 'no matter how well settled and how long 
standing.'" (citation omitted) (quoting Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 
479 F.2d 842, 865 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied. 93 S.Ct. 1550 (1973)); 
Id. at 1143 ("Since the defective regulation wac never valid, there 
was no right to rely on it."); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Hickel, 
432 F.2d 587, 591-92 (10th Cir. 1970) ("[T]he United States may not 
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be estopped from asserting a lawful claim by the erroneous • . • 
actions or statements of its agents or employees . . . . As harsh 
as the tenet is under practical application, an administrative 
determination running contrary to law will not constitute an 
estoppel against the federal government." (footnote omitted)); 
Weese v. Davis County Comm'n, 834 P. 2d 1, 3 (Utah 1992) ("The 
county has only those rights and powers granted it by the Utah 
Constitution and statutes or those implied as a necessary means to 
accomplish them. Any act by the county in excess of this authority 
or forbidden by the Utah Constitution is null and void as an ultra 
vires act." (footnotes omitted)); Id. at 4 ("[T]he promise itself 
exceeded the county,s authority. One who contracts with a 
governing body is presumed to know the statutory and constitutional 
limits of its contracting authority. Therefore, there could be no 
reasonable reliance on the county's alleged promise . . . ." 
(footnote omitted)); City of Mercer Island v. Steinmann, 513 P.2d 
80, 82 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973) ("[Estoppel] will not be applied where 
its application would interfere with the discharge of governmental 
duties or where the officials on whose conduct estoppel is sought 
to be predicated acted beyond their power."). 
And finally, even if the Court believes that estoppel or 
laches has application, such application would not justify 
violations of the field of membership statute by the CUSC 
participants. A claim of estoppel or laches assumes that there has 
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been some act of detrimental reliance by the party making the 
claim. See Celebrity Club. Inc. v. Utah Liouor Control Commission. 
602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979). No such reliance would exist with 
pending CUSC application and the prospective operations of the 
CUSC. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the UBA requests an order denying 
the CUSC application. 
DATED this ' w day of June, 1994. 
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